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MACROECONOMIC TRADE-OFFS IN 
THE EURO AREA
“For the euro area to gradually evolve towards a genuine Economic
and Monetary Union, it will need to shift from a system of rules and
guidelines for national economic policy-making to a system of further
sovereignty sharing within common institutions, most of which already
exist and can progressively fulfil this task. In practice, this would require
Member States to accept increasingly joint decision-making on
elements of their respective national budgets and economic policies.”
Report of the Five Presidents
4.1. The imbalances question
The last year Report of the Five Presidents highlighted the necessity of progress
in the EU in four directions: achieving “a genuine Economic Union, (…) a Finan-
cial Union, (…) a Fiscal Union, (and) a Political Union”. The associated roadmap
for completing the EMU includes a greater focus on employment, a better
implementation of the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure, a better assess-
ment of fiscal stance and fiscal sustainability, the completion of the Banking
Union and the launch of a Capital Markets Union. They thus pointed to a very
large set of ambitions which renewed the debate about the consistency of
existing 6-pack, 2-pack and Fiscal compact, which were mainly related to fiscal
and competitiveness issues.
This roadmap raises an important question: is it possible within the given insti-
tutional setting to close the unemployment gap (the difference between actual
and natural rates of unemployment), that is to say increase the “well-being of
the peoples” (Art. 3 TEU) in a sustainable way, achieve public finance sustaina-
bility, reduce macro imbalances, and ensure the liquidity and solvency of
financial institutions and other objectives at the same moment? 
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Achieving these different objectives is difficult because the needed adjustments
may seem unattainable for economic and institutional reasons, and because of
internal inconsistencies, e.g.:
■ The reduction of external macro imbalances can be achieved by an
improvement in competitiveness in deficit countries, which can be
reached via wages cuts or low wage growth. These structural reforms, if
they are exclusively related to the labour markets, are no panacea and may
be unacceptable by populations who already suffer from high unemploy-
ment and reduced purchasing power. Moreover, they are in contradiction
with the objective of a fairly distributed well-being and with closing the
unemployment gap, since they slash demand and therefore activity in the
short run. They may also weigh on inflation and feed deflation pressures in
the euro area. Therefore, they are also inconsistent with the objective of
price stability of the EMU, and with the achievement of fiscal sustainability:
deflation increases the real value of debts and thus slow-downs the ability
of countries to reduce their debt-to-GDP ratios. Alternative policies could
be implemented for reducing external macro imbalances without harming
other objectives: faster wage growth in surplus countries, investment in
export capacity and lower energy dependency in deficit countries.
■ Fiscal sustainability remains intrinsically related to fiscal austerity which
weighs on price developments, public investment and on output; those
outcomes finally weigh on fiscal sustainability as they increase the real
value of debt or the debt-to-GDP ratios; moreover, low growth prospects
do not help closing the unemployment gap. 
■ The asymmetry in the reduction of macro imbalances, as it stands out in
the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure, has led to the generalization of
current account surpluses all over euro area countries. In this context, the
market mechanism that would reduce current account imbalances is a
euro appreciation. Such an appreciation would be detrimental to the
closure of the unemployment gap: it would indeed reduce exports, but
then also economic growth in a euro area whose recovery remains fragile.
■ As we show in Chapter 2.4, governance reforms are necessary to put well-
being first and establish a framework to deal with economic trade-offs.
Actual institutional design of the EMU and its use by MS does not result in
enough coordination of economic policies to achieve targets like the SDGs
or the ones of the Europe 2020 Strategy, since they do not take into
account the above mentioned internal inconsistencies.
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This chapter aims at quantifying and better understanding the sources of
current account imbalances and high public debt levels.Reducing imbalances
implies some medium-term trade-offs between growth (in the sense of material
well-being and employment), inflation, fiscal balance and current account
balance. This chapter highlights these trade-offs against the backdrop that the
euro area will be forced into an equilibrium of low growth and low inflation that
will make it more painful to reduce external and public disequilibria. It demon-
strates the difficulty of simultaneously reducing all imbalances, all the more that
deflation and euro appreciation risks increase the cost of the reduction of imbal-
ances. Besides, such reduction needs higher MS economic policies
coordination, to avoid asymmetric adjustments that would be more painful, as
we have warned in chapter 3 of the iAGS 2016 Report.
Regarding the difficulty of achieving these different targets, and to make the
adjustment easier, we must consider some new economic policies. First, given a
better coordination of economic policies between MS, relaxing the inflation
target beyond recommended symmetric adjustments in countries with high
current account surplus would open new fiscal space for MS without impinging
on ECB’s price stability objective. Second, relaxing fiscal rules especially to
finance public investment within the objective of fiscal stability (see also
Chapter 3.2) would also give new fiscal space. When public investment is effi-
ciently managed, then, one can expect a positive impact on potential growth.
That means that a permanent increase in public investment, with a long
lifespan of the investment, would increase public capital, potential growth and
net public assets.
4.2. Identifying current account imbalances and nominal 
adjustment needs
Current account imbalances are at the heart of the euro area crisis that begun in
2009. Those imbalances are even seen by some as a threat to the very survival
of the euro area (EA). What are we talking about exactly? What are the
economic causes of these imbalances? Which policies could help with their
unwinding?
The current account of a country is the sum of the trade balance (the balance of
exports and imports, of goods as well as of services) and of the balance of
income and transfers (wages, interests, dividends and gifts received by residents
from abroad, minus those sent abroad by residents). It measures the capacity of
a country to finance its economic activities domestically: if the current account
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is negative, the country needs to import capital from abroad and therefore
accumulates foreign debt; conversely, if the balance is positive, the country
exports capital and becomes a foreign creditor.
When a country has a flexible exchange rate regime, the adjustment of the
exchange rate is the principal equilibrium device that corrects imbalances.
Concretely, if the current account deficit becomes so important that foreign
capital stops financing it, the domestic currency depreciates; in turn, this depre-
ciation stimulates exports and discourages imports, and the current account
balance improves.1 In practice, however, this equilibrating mechanism does not
always work as in this textbook case. Exchange rates can move sharply for
reasons other than fundamentals, and can drive economies away from equilib-
rium at least for certain periods before forcing a correction.
Within a monetary union like the euro area, this adjusting mechanism does not
exist, by design. Large surpluses or deficits can appear without having a self-
adjusting mechanism kicking in. The challenge is therefore to put in place other
equilibrating mechanisms. Failing that, the cohesion of the monetary union
may be threatened: this is precisely the point at which we have arrived today.
a) The dynamics of current accounts in the euro area
Figure 54 pictures the evolution of current accounts of euro area countries.
Two periods can be clearly distinguished. The first one, which goes from 2001
to 2008, corresponds to the deepening of imbalances between countries that,
for convenience, we term northern countries and southern ones. Germany,
which was initially running a small deficit, gradually builds up a very large
surplus; a similar move can be seen in the Netherlands and in Austria. On the
contrary, deficits in Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal increase very significantly.
France, which was in surplus in 2001, gradually slides into deficit during this
period, and can therefore be classified with southern countries according to
this criterion.
1. More precisely, depreciation has two effects on the trade balance: a volume effect, and a price
effect. The volume effect is positive because the depreciation discourages imports (which
become more expensive) and stimulates exports (which become more competitive). But the
price effect is negative because, at a given volume, the value of imports increases while the
value of exports decreases, which harms the current account. The technical condition on the
various elasticities which determines whether the volume effect dominates the price effect is
called the Marshall-Lerner condition. For most countries, this condition is verified in the long
run, but not in the short run, and this gives birth to the so-called “J-curve”: the depreciation
temporarily worsens the trade balance, before improving it permanently.
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Starting from 2009, deficits are brought down, to the point of almost disap-
pearing in 2015, while overall surpluses tend to increase. The process of overall
current account divergence has therefore been put to a halt but it has occurred
in a one-sided way. At the same time, there is a clear break in the relation to the
rest of the world: while the euro area as a whole had an almost balanced
current account between 2001 and 2008, a surplus has started to build up since
2011, reaching a very high level in the last years. Meanwhile Germany’s
surpluses with the southern countries have come down substantially: the
continued overall increase reflects trade outside the euro area.
To summarize, during the 2001-2008 period, the euro area deepened its
internal imbalances while at the same time maintaining its external equilibrium.
On the contrary, during the 2009-2015 period, it somewhat diminished its
internal imbalances, but in a one-sided way and while building up an important
external disequilibrium.
b) The role of current account balances in the euro area crisis
Are the deficits of the South the cause of the crisis of the euro area? Let us first
recall that a current account in deficit is not necessarily the symptom of disequi-
Figure 54. Current accounts in the euro area
In % EA GDP
Source: Economic Outlook 99, iAGS calculations.
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librium. In the case of a country with a strong growth potential, which is in a
process of catching up with more advanced countries, an external deficit can
correspond to a healthy situation: external financing helps accelerating the
development of the country and its catching up of the technological frontier.
Since future growth will provide the basis for reimbursing the liabilities accumu-
lated today, the deficit is only transitory, and there is no reason to worry. This is
precisely the type of reasoning that was mainstream before the financial crisis
and was used to justify the deficits of southern countries (Blanchard and
Giavazzi, 2002).
But in reality, the undergoing process in the euro area was different from this
optimistic scenario and rather corresponded to an unsustainable divergence
dynamics. Incoming private capital flows in southern countries were not
directed at sectors with strong productivity gains, but rather fueled housing
bubbles and financed low-innovation sectors and consumption credit. Conse-
quently, the current account deficits were not sustainable. An adjustment had
become inevitable, and the world financial crisis of 2007-2008 triggered it.
To some extent, the crisis undergone by southern European countries looked
like the phenomenon experienced by emerging countries in the 1980s and
1990s and which is generally labeled as “sudden stops”: the incoming capital
flows that were sustaining the current account deficit suddenly disappeared.
Almost overnight, the improvement of the trade balance had become an urgent
necessity, and the latter could only be obtained through an increase of exports
or a decrease of imports. Moreover, the past current account deficits had led to
an important accumulation of foreign debt, both private and public, which had
become hard to service.
In order to face this situation, emerging countries generally implemented two
policies: first, a currency depreciation, in order to improve their trade balance;
second, a negotiated foreign debt restructuring, or even an outright default in
some cases (the most famous one being Argentina in 2002).
However, the comparison between southern Europe and emerging countries
stops here. The “sudden stop” was less dramatic in southern Europe: some
private capital continued to flow in during the crisis, though at a higher interest
rate, while the cross-country central bank funding (the so-called TARGET2
balances) compensated for the fall of private financing. Moreover, since the
integrity of the euro area has been secured, depreciations have been ruled out.
Debt defaults have been considered as a last resort option, even though a
partial default eventually happened on Greece’s debt. Other adjustment mech-
anisms have therefore been implemented in the euro area, mainly relying on
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austerity policies and wage deflation, which was a drag on economic activity.
Alternative policies—like structural investment in export capacities or alternative
energy production allowing pulling down energy imports (especially important
for the oil-dependent southern periphery) and therefore current account defi-
cits—were not part of the adjustment process. Although their positive current
account effect would have been slower, it would have been more sustainable
and less detrimental to economic activity.
At first glance, the depressing policies have succeeded in correcting current
account deficits. As it is visible in Figure 54, southern Europe countries all posted
a current account surplus in 2015 (except Greece, which ran a small deficit of
only 0.1% of GDP). Nevertheless, the situation is less positive than what a super-
ficial look at current accounts may suggest, especially due to unsustainable high
current account surpluses in some countries. Much remains to be done to
correct imbalances, as we shall see below.
If deficit countries have been the subject of a lot of attention, one should not
forget that some other countries, outstandingly Germany, run very large
surpluses. Of course, deficits are worrying, because they can trigger financing
crises, but surpluses are also a problem. The rationale is simple: the surplus of
someone is necessarily the deficit of someone else. Northern Europe countries
therefore cannot claim that they have no responsibility in the deficits of the
South. And even if it is true that a significant part of the German surplus is today
realized against countries that are outside the euro area, this still has negative
consequences: the appreciating pressure that it engenders on the euro will end
up worsening the competitiveness of southern countries and depreciating the
assets that Germany has accumulated over non-EA countries. Furthermore, high
current account surplus can be seen as import deficits, restraining export possi-
bilities of the trading partners—which are foremost other EA countries. An
exhaustive analysis of the euro area crisis must therefore also include an assess-
ment of the evolutions within surplus countries. Developments outside the EA
also matter, since they have an impact on the exchange rate of the euro,
thereby affecting every single EA member. And last but not least, one has to
remind the economic debate that trade surpluses are a loss of available
resources within the surplus area in exchange to sometimes very uncertain
promises of future repayment. In contrast to an often held misbelieve, trade
surpluses are nothing similar to profits of a private enterprise but rather deliv-
eries against future payment.
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c) Nominal divergence and the role of wages
The debate on the causes of current account disequilibria in the euro area has
been largely focused on wages: the mainstream view is that deficits in the South
were caused by excessive wage increases there, which have harmed competi-
tiveness and therefore trade balances. The austerity policies put a welcome end
to these wrongdoings.
Even though there are some elements of truth in this explanation, it is far too
simplistic, for at least four reasons: first, competitiveness is not the only factor
explaining current accounts, and competitiveness itself is not reducible to
wages; second, it neglects the fact that imports are as important as exports to
explain the current account. Although wages are an important determinant of
demand and therefore imports, attention has to be paid to profits and espe-
cially credit bubbles as well; third, the analysis must distinguish between
nominal wages and real wages, which have evolved differently; fourth, one
should also look at wages in northern countries, which can symmetrically be
considered as not dynamic enough.
In order to explain the evolution of current accounts, the notion of competitive-
ness is generally put forward: it is defined as the capacity of a firm or a country
to be more successful than its competitors in the battle for market shares.
However, as Krugman already has shown in 1994 in his critique to the new
competitiveness strategy raised by the European Commission at this time, it is
not obvious that the concept of competitiveness can be used for countries as a
whole, because they should cooperate among each other and are not
competing on markets (but firms producing inside their borders).2 Even if
competitiveness is attributed to countries as a whole, it is not the only factor
explaining current accounts: the other major determinant is internal demand. A
country that is in bad cyclical conditions (i.e. with a negative output gap)
imports less, and therefore sees its current account temporarily improved. The
cyclical condition of trade partners also matters, because if they have a positive
output gap, they will boost the exports of the domestic country, whose current
account will therefore improve.
Notwithstanding, competitiveness remains a determinant of the dynamics of
current account surpluses and deficits. But it is not reducible to wages. One
generally distinguishes two dimensions of competitiveness: the price competi-
tiveness, that is the price of domestic exports relatively to that of competitors;
2. See Krugman (1994).
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and the non-price competitiveness, which includes factors that are less easily
quantified, such as the target market segment (high end or low end), or brand
as well as reputation effects. Finally, price competitiveness itself is not only
about wages, since it clearly also depends on productivity and profit margins. It
is thus clear that wages are not the only factor that matters, even though they
play a role.
Were wage increases in the South excessive? In order to determine it, unit
labour costs (ULC) are the appropriate analytical tool.
If one looks at real ULC, that is the evolution of real wages relatively to produc-
tivity gains (see Figure 55), it appears that they have remained stable or have
decreased in most countries between 1999 and 2007. They have substantially
decreased in Portugal and Spain (as much as in Germany), while they have
remained constant in Italy and increased slightly in Greece (3.6% cumulated
over 8 years). Said otherwise, during the period preceding the crisis, the
purchasing power of wage earners has increased less than productivity in most
Southern countries, which means that the aggregate primary income distribu-
tion has evolved to the benefits of profits and to the detriment of wage earners.
One can therefore hardly say that excessive real wage increases in the South are
at the root of current account imbalances.
Figure 55. Real unit labour costs in the euro area
Source: European Commission.
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On the other hand, the picture looks very different if one looks at nominal ULC,
that is the evolution of nominal wages relatively to productivity gains (see
Figure 56). From the beginning of the Monetary Union in 1999, to 2009, the
divergence has been strong, between on one side Germany which has gone
through a strong wage moderation, and on the other side Spain, Italy, Greece
(and to a lesser extent Portugal) which displayed dynamic nominal wages.
France, as often, stands in a middle ground. This divergence is essentially a
nominal one since, as we have seen above, the divergence of real wages was
rather limited (and did not follow a South/North pattern). In other words, the
euro area divergence mainly comes from an inflation differential, which is a
clear sign of a failure of the EU market doctrine. In contrast to the neoliberal
concept of market integration, prices did not converge under the single
currency—quite to the contrary, they diverged.
On Figure 56 we have added a line corresponding to the “golden wage rule”
within a monetary union: this rule corresponds to nominal ULC that increase of
2% per year, that is at the same rate as the European Central Bank (ECB) infla-
tion target (e.g. Watt 2007). To the extent that nominal ULC strongly
determine inflation, following this rule would imply on one hand that the target
of the ECB is reached, and on the other hand that the relative price competitive-
Figure 56. Nominal unit labour costs in the euro area
Source: European Commission.
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ness of member states is not modified. For the EA as a whole, the evolution of
the nominal ULC was in line with that rule until the crisis. Afterwards, due to the
policy of internal devaluation within southern countries, wage developments
fall behind, leading to a lack in aggregate demand and therefore deflation pres-
sure and a high current account surplus. 
At the country level, it is interesting to note that France, as well as Belgium and
the Netherlands, have almost perfectly followed the golden wage rule, at least
until 2012. On the other hand, both Germany and southern countries violated
it, though in opposite directions.3
Starting from 2009, an uneven adjustment process can be observed. Italy slows
downs its wages and fills part of its deviation from the 2% rule. Spain, Portugal
and Greece go through a much more violent adjustment, with significant wage
decreases and the entrance into a deflationary dynamics. Germany on the other
hand makes little adjustment: far from filling the deviation from the golden rule
that it built during the 2000-2007 years, it even dug it a little bit during the
last years.
To which extent does the divergence of nominal wages explain the divergence
of current accounts? In the end, this is an empirical question that can only be
settled using econometric techniques. Ragot and Le Moigne (2015) thus esti-
mate that almost half of the gap between the trade performances of France and
Germany on the 1993-2012 period can be explained by the wage divergence,
the remainder being mainly attributed to non-price competitiveness factors. In
any case, even if wages do not explain everything, they are an important driver
of current accounts, and they strongly contributed to the divergence of the first
half of the 2000s and to the timid re-convergence of the last years.
d) How large are the remaining nominal imbalances?
Looking at Figure 54, one could conclude that the problem of current account
imbalances is now behind us: in 2015, all euro area countries either were in
surplus, or had reduced their deficit to a very small size.
The reality is however much more nuanced and structural imbalances remain
very large.
3. See Chagny and Husson (2004) for a more detailed analysis of the various wage regimes in
Europe.
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Indeed, a significant part of the current account improvement in southern
countries comes not from an improvement of their export performance, but
from a diminishing of their imports. This phenomenon can be explained by the
squeeze of internal demand following the sovereign debt crisis and the austerity
policies, which have reduced purchasing power and economic activity. When
those countries recover from this cyclical downturn, and in particular when
their unemployment rate comes back to more acceptable levels, their imports
will rise again and their trade balance will worsen. Unless one considers that
being perpetually in crisis is the fate of those countries, one cannot claim that
the improvement of their trade balance corresponds to a structural and perma-
nent adjustment. At most, there is a debate on the exact magnitude of the
cyclical part of the adjustment, whose estimation depends on the output gap,
which is itself hard to know precisely.
Moreover, the euro area as a whole is currently in external disequilibrium. In
2015, it posted an aggregate current account surplus of about 3.8% of GDP. In
value, this corresponds to 394 € bn, which is much more than the surplus of
China! In a system of flexible exchange rates—the parity of the euro against
other currencies being market determined—it is illusory to hope to sustain such
a surplus on the long term. Even if for the moment, the differential of monetary
policies across both sides of the Atlantic Ocean help sustaining the statu quo,
the inevitable normalization of the ECB policy will induce an appreciation of the
euro. This will harm the price competitiveness of the euro area as a whole and
consequently its trade surplus as well. If the hierarchy within the euro area
remains what it is today, this will lead to a—reduced—surplus for northern
countries and to a return into deficits for southern countries; that is, a similar
situation as in 2008.
In order to provide a quantitative assessment of nominal imbalances within the
euro area, we have applied a “fundamental equilibrium exchange rate” meth-
odology. The idea is to focus the analysis on price adjustments: we compute the
adjustment of the general price level in every euro area economy that would be
compatible with both an internal equilibrium (that is the full utilization of
production factors, both labour and capital) and an external equilibrium (that is
a current account deficit small enough to limit foreign debt accumulation—or
conversely a surplus that does not lead to an excessive accumulation of foreign
assets). The computation also depends on the sensitivity of imports and exports
to price movements of domestic and foreign exporters.4 Table 13 shows the
4. See iAGS (2014) for a complete description of the methodology. The price elasticities have been
updated for the four largest euro area countries.
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nominal adjustments that we estimate were still necessary in 2015, computed
relatively to the EA average, which is the relevant reference point to counter
imbalances within the EA.5
Several groups of countries can be identified. Germany, Austria and the Nether-
lands must appreciate relatively to the EA average, by up to 13% for Germany.
At the other extreme, Greece must undergo a depreciation of about 22% rela-
tively to the EA average, despite the sacrifices already made: even if today the
Greek current account is close to equilibrium, its output gap is very negative,
and the improvement is therefore largely cyclical. Between these two extremes
there is a group of countries that must undergo a depreciation between 5
and 12% relatively to the EA average, which includes France, Spain, Portugal
and Italy.
Table 13. Nominal adjustments needed
EA 0%
DEU +13%
AUT +6%
BEL -14%
ESP -8%
FIN -14%
FRA -7%
GRC -22%
IRL -12%
ITA -5%
NLD +8%
PRT -12%
Since the adjustments reported here consider only the internal imbalances of the euro area, the
adjustment needs of the EA as a whole relatively to the rest of the world are not analyzed. Yet,
today, the euro is undervalued, given the large trade surplus of the area. A real appreciation is
therefore needed to go back to equilibrium, and that can be obtained either through a nominal
appreciation or through price increases within the euro area. The latter solution would be prefera-
ble, in order to avoid a deflationary spiral, and in that case price increases should be much more
important in Germany than in Southern countries, as indicated in Table 1.
Source: iAGS model.
5. For an overall macroeconomic analysis, a better reference point would be the golden wage rule.
As the focus here lies on the adjustment needs of countries within the EA to counter current
account imbalances, we take the (weighted) average.
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The size of the adjustments needs to rule out imbalances as they have been
identified by this procedure can look significant. One should however keep in
mind that our computations are based on the hypothesis that competitiveness
adjustments only go through the price dimension, and that other dimensions
remains unchanged. The needed nominal adjustments would be smaller if
southern countries were able to improve their non-price competitiveness,
through the implementation of other policies like investment in export capacity
and lower energy dependency. In any case, our results show that internal imbal-
ances within the euro area are far from being resolved, contrary to what a
superficial analysis of the current accounts may suggest.
e) Designing a cooperative convergence strategy
The strategy followed until now for unwinding the imbalances has therefore not
delivered. It has essentially consisted in cutting ULC in the South, both indi-
rectly by deflating demand through fiscal austerity and more directly using
several instruments: decreases of minimum wages and of public servants’
compensations, cuts in social security contributions and benefits, facilitation of
layoffs, decentralization of wage negotiations, etc. But that strategy has failed
for two reasons.
First, even if wage costs indeed explain part of the divergence, they are not the
only determinant of competitiveness, as we have seen. The increase of margins,
especially visible in Greece or Spain, has largely neutralized the decrease in
wage costs, which means that export prices have not changed much.6 And for
the time being, nothing shows that the recovery of margins has fuelled an
investment dynamics. Policies consisting of lowering social security contribu-
tions, like the “Responsibility Pact” and the CICE in France, follow the same
logic and so far, did not produce very tangible effects; additionally, they are
one-shot policies (it is not possible to indefinitely lowering social contributions),
and are thus ill-suited for compensating persistent inflation differentials on the
medium term.
Second, wage austerity had collateral effects that were worse than the ill they
were supposed to cure. The collapse of internal demand that followed has
pushed southern countries into a crisis from which they have not yet recovered.
Admittedly, it has led to a resolution of the current account deficit, but which is
only of a temporary and cyclical nature. Furthermore, the generalized down-
6. See for example Uxó et al. (2014). 
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ward adjustment of wages carries the risk of pushing the euro area into a
dangerous deflationary spiral. The asymmetric nature of the macroeconomic
surveillance is at the root of the problem: in practice, only deficit countries are
forced to adjust, while surplus countries are not, and this creates a deflationary
bias (see Appendix 3 for a discussion on the asymmetric nature of the macroe-
conomic surveillance). This is an implicit validation of the neo-mercantilist
strategy, inherently non-cooperative, that threatens the cohesion of the euro
area. Paradoxically, the purpose of the EMU was precisely to prevent such a
non-cooperative behaviour, by depriving Member States from the possibility of
performing competitive depreciations.
If a new crisis is to be avoided—and such a crisis could threaten the very exist-
ence of the euro—it is therefore necessary to put in place a different
convergence strategy, that would be of a cooperative nature and would rely on
two pillars: a nominal and a structural one.
To ensure that nominal convergence is achieved, i.e. that inflation rates are
harmonized and that there is no distortion of relative price competitiveness, the
most efficient instrument would be a coordinated wage policy. It would be built
on the “golden wage rule” already described above: in each country, nominal
wages would move in the medium term at the same rate as domestic produc-
tivity, augmented by the inflation target of 2%. In the short run, however, the
rule should be amended to correct the imbalances identified in Table 13. More
precisely, wages in the North would rise faster than the rule during a given
period, while they would rise slower in the South. However, given that profit
margins are at a historical high in most southern countries, the adjustment
could also include a diminishing of margins, that would allow for a more
dynamic wage growth.
For this objective to be reached, the macroeconomic surveillance instruments
must be modified. In particular, the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure
currently sanctions countries with too dynamic unit labour costs, but not those
with too weak wages growth; the rule thus needs to be made symmetric. But,
beyond that, new tools must be created for the implementation of a wage coor-
dination policy: generalization of wage floors through minimum wages or
collective agreements and cross-country coordination of their increases, recen-
tralization of wage negotiations at the national and sectoral levels,
generalizations of collective agreements…
However, even if nominal convergence is a necessary condition for the coher-
ence of the Monetary Union, it shall not be sufficient. Policies aiming at the
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convergence of productive capacities and standards of living must also be
implemented.
A policy of massive investments is thus needed in the South, to recreate or
consolidate industrial sectors that are either strategic or with a high productivity
gains potential, that could in particular help with restoring non-price competi-
tiveness. Given the state of the business cycle and of public finances in these
countries, these investments must be partly financed, at least in the short term,
by transfers coming from the North. The Juncker plan could have been the
vector of this policy, but it is clearly undersized and is not targeted on countries
and sectors that need it the most. Moreover, in the specific case of Greece,
further measures to reduce the public debt burden are necessary.
The obstacles to changes proposed here are mainly of a political nature:
northern countries hold the power to decide whether these changes will be put
in place or not. Today, those countries could have the sentiment that they are
in a favourable position and that there is no urgency in accepting a reorienta-
tion of the euro area. That would however be a short-sighted calculation:
internal imbalances within the euro area are dangerous enough to put into
question its very existence, in particular in the case of a new financial shock.
And even if the breakup of the euro would be painful for southern countries,
northern countries would also have a lot to lose, especially on the foreign assets
that they have accumulated.
4.3. How to tackle internal and external imbalances
Reducing imbalances implies some medium-term trade-offs between growth,
inflation, fiscal balance and current account balance. This part highlights these
trade-offs against the backdrop that the euro area will be forced into an equilib-
rium of low growth and low inflation that will make it more painful to reduce
external and public disequilibria. It establishes the difficulty of simultaneously
reducing all imbalances, all the more that deflation and euro appreciation risks
increasing the cost of the reduction of imbalances. Regarding the difficulty of
reducing imbalances, and to make the adjustment easier, we then consider
some new economic policies. First, given a better coordination of economic
policies between MS, relaxing the inflation target beyond recommended
symmetric adjustments in countries with high current account surplus would
open new fiscal space for MS without impinging on ECB’s price stability objec-
tive. Second, relaxing fiscal rules especially to finance public investment within
the objective of fiscal stability would also give new fiscal space. 
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a) Complying with the fiscal rule: is there a need for additional fiscal 
effort?
The current governance in the euro area mainly hinges on two pillars. On the
one hand, countries are requested to comply with the Stability and Growth
Pact, which is based on a “preventive” and a “corrective arm”. In the “preven-
tive arm”, governments are expected to implement sound fiscal policies. To this
end, they commit to an MTO (Medium-term objective) defined as a target for
the structural deficit. In the “corrective arm”, euro area members avoid exces-
sive budget deficits and excessive public debt. Budget deficit is considered
excessive when it is greater than 3% of GDP. Public debt is considered excessive
if it exceeds 60% of GDP without diminishing at an adequate rate (defined as a
decrease of the excess debt by 5% per year on average over three years). On
the other hand, it has been emphasized that the scope of surveillance should go
beyond public finance and should also focus on other macroeconomic indica-
tors. The MIP (Macroeconomic imbalances procedure) has been introduced to
this end as part of the “Six-pack”. The MIP aims at “preventing and addressing
the emergence of potentially harmful macroeconomic imbalances that could
adversely affect economic stability in a particular Member State”. In practice,
the focus is mainly devoted to current account imbalances and competitiveness.
In Chapter 1, we assess whether countries would be able to achieve a 60%
debt-to-GDP ratio by 2035 (see Table A1 and Table A2 in Appendix 4; see also
Table A5 for main hypotheses). It notably suggests that France, Italy, Spain,
Belgium, Portugal, Greece and Finland may be requested to implement
additional fiscal consolidation beyond 2018 to avoid an excessive public debt
(Figure 57). Germany, the Netherlands and Ireland would have fiscal space as
their debt-to-GDP ratio would stand below 60% in 2035. For the euro area,
debt would reach 71% of GDP. Consequently, the additional fiscal effort would
be substantial for Greece, exceeding 9 points of GDP, but also for France,
Spain and Italy (Figure 57). It is also suggested that complying with the debt
rule would entail significant output costs. The average output gap would
decrease notably in countries where additional fiscal consolidation is imple-
mented. Though the output gap would improve for Germany, the Netherlands
and Ireland, the average situation of the euro area would deteriorate, illus-
trating that fiscal expansion in countries with fiscal space would not
compensate for output losses in countries where adjustment is needed to
satisfy the debt criterion.
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Figure 57. Public debt in 2035, fiscal impulse and output gap
               Source: iAGS model.
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 Turning to current account imbalances, model simulations also illustrate the
path for the current account dynamics for 11 euro area countries. In the base-
line scenario, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Ireland and Austria would be in
surplus in 2016. These surpluses would improve for all these countries except
Austria (Figure 58). In 2035, the German current account surplus would
amount to 13% of GDP while it would exceed 9% in the Netherlands. During
all the period, it would stand above 6% for these two countries, which is the
upper limit set in the scoreboard designed to capture the most relevant internal
and external sources of macroeconomic imbalances. Countries with the highest
current account deficit in 2016 would be Portugal and Greece. The current
account deficit in these countries would exceed 4%, the threshold above which
a macroeconomic imbalance would be signalled triggering an alert mechanism
report. Moreover, the current account deficit would deteriorate in Greece from
2016 to 2035. The developments below will assess the consequences of
adjusting current account imbalances. Furthermore, it must also be noticed that
the current account surplus for the euro area would increase from 2.1% in 2016
to 5.2% in 2035, raising the risk of euro appreciation. 
Figure 58. Baseline – Current account in 2016 and in 2035
Source: iAGS model.
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b) Complying with external imbalances: adjusting nominal 
discrepancies?
In the first section, it has been suggested that adjustment in current accounts
are needed despite a significant reduction of deficits since the outbreak of the
crises. As output gap is still negative for several countries, structural current
account deficits are expected to persist. The required nominal adjustment to
cope with financial imbalances is then computed by applying a “fundamental
equilibrium exchange rate” methodology. In what follows, it is considered that
the adjustment would be symmetric7 as countries with a current account
surplus would implement “reflation” policies and tolerate inflation rates above
the 2%. The relative nominal price adjustment for each euro area country is
computed such that the average inflation for the euro as a whole reaches the
2% target fixed by the ECB. The adjustment is supposed to be spread over a 20-
year period. As in the iAGS 2016 report we assume that euro area countries are
able to influence inflation and expected inflation in their own countries by
implementing reforms such that the required nominal adjustment is realized.
Moreover, while non-cost competitiveness matters for reducing imbalances, we
assume that the reduction of structural current account imbalances is realized
only through relative price adjustments. Non-cost competitiveness has multiple
dimensions and cannot be captured with a single and simple indicator. More-
over, the way that economic policies can influence non-cost competitiveness
remains uncertain. Consequently, the required nominal adjustment computed
in the previous section and used in simulations below may be considered as an
upper limit.
In case of a symmetric adjustment, the target for expected inflation is higher for
Germany, the Netherlands, Ireland and Austria while it would be lower for
France, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Greece, Portugal and Finland (Table 14). Consid-
ering that expected inflation is anchored on these targets would have an impact
on the real interest rate in each euro area country and would then change the
requested fiscal adjustment to achieve a 60% debt-to-GDP ratio. Fiscal impulses
(FI) are then adjusted for this purpose. Simulations presented in Table A3 in
appendix show output gaps, inflation and current accounts dynamics in this
situation where countries try to address the debt constraint and avoid external
imbalances. First, all countries but Greece would be able to reach a 60% debt-
7. iAGS 2016 report has dealt with the case of the asymmetric adjustment and showed that the
cost of adjusting simultaneously public debt and current account imbalances would entail
significant output costs. 
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to-GDP ratio. The Greek situation would be slightly deteriorated as public debt
would increase if the country tried to cope with external imbalances and simul-
taneously tried to reduce public debt.
Figure 59 and Figure 60 highlight the main consequences of this strategy in
terms of current account dynamics and output gaps. The details of simulations
for the 11 euro area countries are presented in Table A3 in the Appendix. It may
first be noted that ex post nominal price adjustments relative to EA average price
level from 2016 to 2035 are important: above 0.2% each year for Italy, France,
Spain, Portugal, Finland, Belgium and Greece. Nominal price level relative to EA
average would increase for Germany, Austria, the Netherlands and Ireland.
Table 14. Symmetric price adjustments
DEU FRA ITA ESP NLD BEL GRC PRT IRL AUT FIN EA
Annual deviation 
from 2% target
0.6 -0.3 -0.2 -0.4 0.4 -0.7 -1.0 -0.6 0.5 0.3 -0.7 0
Source: iAGS model.
Figure 59. Symmetric price adjustments – Average inflation and current account 
improvement
Note: current account improvement is computed as the difference between current account adjustment in the
symmetric price adjustment case and the current account adjustment with no price adjustment. In each case,
FI are computed to achieve 60% of public debt-to-GDP ratio where it is possible.
Source: iAGS model.
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Figure 59 and Figure 60 compare the situation in which the euro area simulta-
neously reduces public debt and current account imbalances with the situation
where they only comply with the 60% target for public debt. The current
account balance would improve for all countries except Germany, Ireland and
the Netherlands even though the change in the current account balance would
be inferior to 1 point in Ireland and in the Netherlands. For Spain and Greece,
the internal devaluation would be associated with an improvement of the
current account balance close to 5 points between 2016 and 2035. In France
and in Italy the positive change would reach 2.5 and 2.6 points respectively.
Finally, the current surplus of Germany would be reduced by 3.8 points. 
The impact of addressing current account imbalances on fiscal policy and
output gap would depend on several forces. On the one hand, the decrease in
relative prices would increase competitiveness and the output gap. This would
also have a positive effect on the debt dynamic due the automatic stabilizers
effect. On the other hand, the real interest rate would increase, reducing the
output gap and increasing public debt. The global effect would notably depend
on the sensitivity of external trade to the relative prices but also on the addi-
tional effort that may be required to achieve a 60% debt ratio. For Greece,
there would be no increase in fiscal consolidation as it would already have
Figure 60. Symmetric price adjustments – Fiscal space and growth
Source: iAGS model.
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reached its maximum (0.5 point per year). Public debt would therefore increase
but Greece would benefit from the internal devaluation so that the output gap
effect would be positive. Portugal would be constrained to increase fiscal
consolidation to be able to achieve a 60% debt-to-GDP ratio. This additional
fiscal consolidation would offset the positive impact of competitiveness on the
output gap. Finally, the average output gap would be reduced for countries
where the relative price would increase: Germany, the Netherlands and Ireland.
For the euro area, the change in the average output gap would be close to zero.
c) Complying with external imbalances: which euro appreciation?
As recalled in the first part of this chapter, the aggregate current account of the
EA was highly positive in 2015. On the medium run, once monetary policies
have normalised, this may lead to an appreciation of the euro that would
restore the external equilibrium of the EA. It is therefore necessary to study the
macroeconomic consequences of that appreciation, and in particular how it
interacts with the internal and external equilibrium of EA countries.
Using iAGS model, we compute the level of euro exchange rate compatible
with EA current account equilibrium around 2035. Figure 61 pictures the
outcome of a euro appreciation, following a normalization of the monetary
policy in 2018, up to an exchange rate of 1.20$ (in our baseline scenario, the
euro stabilizes at 1.05$). The horizontal axis corresponds to the current account
in 2035 without the euro appreciation (as studied in the previous section). The
vertical axis corresponds to the change in the 2035 current account caused by
the euro appreciation, relative to the previous scenario. The black line therefore
corresponds to an equilibrated current account in 2035 after the appreciation,
which is the case for the EA current account.
The figure also illustrates that achieving EA external equilibrium would not be
the result of a homogenous adjustment among EA countries.8 Some countries
would adjust too much (Portugal, and in a minor fashion Finland, Belgium,
France, Italy), whereas others would only partialy adjust (Ireland, Netherlands,
Germany) or even increase their current account imbalance (Greece). Of
course, the euro area must be seen as an integrated economic area in which
current account imbalances would not matter, not only a fixed exchange rate
area in which current accounts should be balanced in the medium run for all
countries. But it seems now that the EA is not enough integrated to fully disre-
8. See also Table A4 in Appendix 4.
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gard external imbalances between EA countries. It is all the more the case as
countries that overadjust are mainly countries that would have to restore
competitiveness, as we have seen in Figure 59.
An appreciation of the euro may then contradict the correction of external
imbalances. Figure 62 also demonstrates that it could impinge on correcting
internal disequilibrium (high unemployment and public) for some countries.
Euro appreciation would increase fiscal austerity to achieve the 60% to GDP
public debt ratio for Italy and Spain, and reduce fiscal space for Germany and
Netherlands, as it would weigh on growth for these countries. But other coun-
tries would benefit from the appreciation9 (Portugal, Finland, Belgium and
Austria) since the appreciation would impact in different ways price-competi-
tiveness of exports and terms of trade among EA countries. These results imply
that a rebalancing of the euro area current account may be detrimental to euro
area convergence and integration.
Figure 61. Euro appreciation to 1.2$ – impact on current account
Source: iAGS model.
9. See Box 5 for an explanation.
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d) Remaining risks and relaxing constraints to ease the adjustment
EA adjustments to stabilise debt, reduce current account imbalances and EA
current account surplus seem quite huge. They could be even greater if some
risks—low inflation, euro exchange rate appreciation—materialise in the future.
Facing such risks, EA institutions need some leeway to avoid EA collapse. In this
part, we stress these risks and we discuss some tools to cope with them.
Remaining risks increasing imbalances across EA countries 
As we have warned in past iAGS, low inflation would increase EA macroeco-
nomic imbalances. If the ECB were to miss its 2% target on average by -0.1% a
year from 2020 to 2035, public debt in EA would be about 2 points higher in
2035 (Figure 63). This would be due to higher real interest rates that would
impinge growth: cumulative output gap would be 0.7 point lower. Low infla-
tion would then increase fiscal adjustment needs for countries with a high
public debt. Regarding additional debt and growth losses, countries would not
be impacted in the same way as Greece, Portugal, Austria and Belgium would
be the most impacted ones.
Figure 62. Euro appreciation to 1.2$ – fiscal space and growth
Source: iAGS model.
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EA countries do not have the same trade openness, and their trade share with
the rest of the world (i.e. all non EA member states) varies. Trade elasticities (for
import and export volumes and prices) also differ from one country to another.
These differences induce varying current account deviations following a lower
inflation than targeted by the ECB. All countries gain price competitiveness
compared to the rest of the world and improve their current account balance.
On average, the EA current account would increase by 0.4 point of GDP, and
increases would be the highest in Italy and Spain (Table 15). But some countries
(Greece, Ireland, Finland and Austria) would suffer a deteriorating current
account, since price competitiveness gains would not compensate for deterio-
rating terms of trade and lower imports coming from other EA countries due to
lower growth. 
Figure 63. Deflation risk – Impact of a lower inflation (-0.1% each year, 2020-2035) 
on debt and growth
Source: iAGS model.
Table 15. Deflation risk – impact on current account in 2035
% of GDP, value
DEU FRA ITA ESP NLD BEL GRC PRT IRL AUT FIN EA
CA variation 0.3 0.5 0.8 0.9 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 -0.3 -0.5 -0.2 0.4
Source: iAGS model.
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These results demonstrate that inflation must be high enough in the EA: low
inflation would increase current accounts disequilibrium in addition to raising
fiscal efforts to stabilise public debt. But as low inflation would favour EA current
account surplus, it would then also push for euro exchange rate appreciation.
Box 2. Describing risk scenarios
The ability to reduce macroeconomic imbalances depends especially on infla-
tion dynamics. As emphasized in a debt-deflation spiral, the real debt burden
becomes higher when countries enter into deflation. Taking into account the
constraints imposed by the TSCG may then force governments to further
austerity measures reinforcing the deflation risk and increasing the debt
burden. Moreover, deflation changes relative export and import prices in all EA
countries. In that case, simple Marshall-Lerner conditions may not be sufficient
to ensure a trade balance improvement following a gain in price-competitive-
ness of exports due to lower inflation: one EA country may gain
competitiveness against the rest of the world but be less competitive towards
its partners. Put another way, the fall in imports value does not compensate for
the fall in exports value, once volume variations are accounted for.
To this end, we analyse the consequences of a decrease of the inflation rate
under the following scenario. We consider a symmetric shock consisting in a
drop in the ECB inflation target over the period 2016-2035. We consider a
0.1 point decrease.
Regarding current account surplus of the EA, EA countries face a risk of euro
exchange rate appreciation. The appreciation would rebalance the aggregate
trade balance of the EA and the current account too. But the loss of competi-
tiveness towards the rest of the world would be detrimental to growth. And
whereas the aggregate trade balance would rebalance, it may not be the case
for all countries: in the same way as a low deflation shock, exchange rate appre-
ciation would modify relative export and import prices in all EA countries,
affecting current accounts in opposite ways from one country to another. The
third point is that exchange rate appreciation would lead to imported disinfla-
tion, reinforcing the debt-deflation spiral and forcing governments to further
austerity measures reinforcing the deflation risk and increasing the debt burden.
To this end, we analyse the consequences of a euro exchange rate apprecia-
tion under the following scenario. We consider a 2% appreciation of the euro
in 2016 and maintained until 2035.
For simulations, we use the iAGS model (technical appendix is available on
request). For the baseline scenario from which we compute differences we
assume that:
— fiscal policy entails achieving 60% public debt-to-GDP ratio in 2035;
— symmetric nominal adjustments to correct EA internal current accounts
discrepancies;
— euro exchange rate appreciation to 1.2 dollar in 2020 and beyond.
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A euro exchange rate appreciation would counteract the price-competitiveness
gains due to lower inflation. For example, a 2% appreciation from 2020 onward
would lead to a decrease of the EA current account (CA) deficit by 0.6 point of
GDP in 2035 (Figure 64). Spain, Italy, Portugal, France and Germany would be
the most impacted countries regarding current account deviations. 
Wheras it would limit the EA current account increase, a euro appreciation
would nevertheless increase other imbalances. Growth would be lower in EA
(-2.1 cumulative output gap on 2020-2035, Table 16) and unemployment
higher. Public debt would then increase on average (+1.9 point of GDP in
2035). Italy and Spain would have to do more effort to achieve 60% of GDP
debt ratio, and fiscal space would be reduced in Germany and Netherlands.
Figure 64. Exchange rate risk – Impact of a 2% appreciation of euro on trade balance
Source: iAGS model.
Table 16. Exchange rate risk – impact on current account in 2035
% of GDP
DEU FRA ITA ESP NLD BEL GRC PRT IRL AUT FIN EA
Public debt variation 4.3 0.2 3.5 2.9 2.3 -3.0 -3.5 -6.5 1.0 -1.5 -2.3 1.9
Cumulative output gap 
variation
-3.9 -0.6 -3.0 -3.2 -2.5 1.3 2.1 4.1 -2.3 0.2 1.2 -2.1
CA variation -0.6 -0.6 -1.0 -1.2 0.0 -0.2 0.1 -0.7 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.6
Source: iAGS model.
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Some ways to ease the adjustment
In the previous sections, we have illustrated the adjustments which are needed
for countries either to comply with debt objectives or to deal with current
account imbalances, and the risks going with these adjustments. On the one
hand, they would imply additional fiscal consolidation for some countries and,
on the other hand, some countries would also need to adjust relative prices. It
should be noticed that countries, which are supposed to implement further
consolidation are generally those that will need to adjust relative prices. This is
notably the case for: France, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Portugal and Greece. Yet,
these objectives might not be compatible. Besides, the reduction of public debt
to reach the 60% debt-to-GDP ratio would reduce growth and then curb
recovery. The adjustment of prices would also slow down the reduction of
public debt, forcing Member States to increase fiscal consolidation further,
weighing down on growth. Euro area countries may then try to square the
circle and be constrained to forsake one of the three objectives (economic
growth, external and public balances).
A first possibility would be to frontload fiscal adjustment by using fiscal space in
countries having some fiscal leeway and high current account surplus, mainly
Germany, Austria and Netherlands. In these countries, higher public spending
would sustain growth and inflation. It would also increase exports of EA part-
ners, and produce an improvement in the convergence between EA countries,
without endangering the sustainability of public finances. But such fiscal stim-
ulus may not be enough to significantly sustain economic growth in other EA
countries: spill-over-effects shall be small for two reasons. The first one is that
the German economy seems to be at full employment. A fiscal stimulus would
probably only produce small growth effects and exports for partners since fiscal
multipliers are smaller when output gap is close to zero. The other reason is that
Netherlands and Austria are not big enough economies to significantly stimu-
late partners’ economy.
Using the iAGS Model, we illustrate this point by simulating a 1% of GDP
increase in public spending of Germany, Netherlands and Austria from 2017.10
The cumulative impact on German economy would be rather small (+1.1% of
10. For simulations, we use the iAGS model (technical appendix is available on request). For the
baseline scenario from which we compute differences we assume that:
— fiscal policy entails achieving 60% public debt-to-GDP ratio in 2035;
— symmetric nominal adjustments to correct EA internal current accounts discrepancies;
— euro exchange rate appreciation to 1.2 dollar in 2020 and beyond.
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cumulative output gap during the period 2017-2035, see Table 17). The effect
on Austria and Netherlands would be higher (respectively +2.6% and +3.0% of
cumulative output gap) since these countries start with a higher negative output
gap. The results show quasi-null spill-over effects on the other EA countries.
To ease the adjustment, EA countries need some leeway that avoids the caveats
of a fiscal stimulus restricted to a small group of countries. A more efficient
policy consists in making a fiscal stimulus in all EA countries, to maximise spill-
over effects and to deal with high unemployment in the EA. To finance the
stimulus a golden rule for public investment would allow reconsidering the
fiscal targets. When public investment is efficiently managed, then, one can
expect a positive impact on potential growth. Academics agree on an elasticity
of at least .1 between public capital stock and potential growth (see Bom and
Lightart (2014) for a recent survey). That is true even with less materialistic cate-
gories of capital stock like human capital. That means that a permanent increase
in public investment by .1% per year, with a 20 years lifespan of the investment
(a higher life span multiplies the effect), would increase public capital by 2%
and long term output by .2%/year. In the end net public assets would increase.
Table 17. Using fiscal space in Germany, Austria and Netherlands: +1% of GDP 
public spending expenditures from 2017
Public debt 
(% of GDP)
Structural 
balance
% of GDP)
Cumulative fis-
cal impulse (%)
Cumulative out-
put gap (%)
(1)
2035
(2)
2035
(3)
2015-2035*
(4)
2016-2035
DEU 17 -1.5 1.0 1.1
FRA 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
ITA 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
ESP 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
NLD 14 -1.2 1.0 3.0
BEL 0 0.0 0.0 0.1
PRT 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
IRL 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
GRC 0 0.0 0.0 0.2
FIN 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
AUT 15 -1.3 1.0 2.6
EA 7 -0.6 0.4 0.6
Source: iAGS model.
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The following simulations11 show that, when this effect is added to plain
Keynesian effect (short term multipliers) and to wise back-loading (higher fiscal
multiplier when unemployment is high, zero lower bound when deflation is a
high probability risk), the increase in debt (full public financing of the invest-
ment) is small.
To illustrate this point, we compute the new fiscal space compatible with a 61%
public debt-to-GDP ratio in 2035 in all countries but Greece. Countries would
use this fiscal space in 2017 to increase public investment. Results show that
most countries with a negative output gap (Netherlands, Spain, France, Italy,
Belgium, Portugal) would have a higher fiscal space, about 0.15% of GDP (see
Figure 65) and would gain about 0.2 to 0.3% of cumulative GDP growth. In
2035, public debt would only be increased by 1% of GDP. In fine, 1 additional
percentage point of public debt would give way to a 0.6% increase of net
public assets12 in 2035 in the euro area, thanks to a public investment increase
by 0.1% of GDP starting from 2017 (Table 18).
11. For simulations, we use the iAGS model (technical appendix is available on request). For the
baseline scenario from which we compute differences we assume that:
— fiscal policy entails achieving 60% public debt-to-GDP ratio in 2035;
— symmetric nominal adjustments to correct EA internal current accounts discrepancies;
— euro exchange rate appreciation to 1.2 dollar in 2020 and beyond.
Figure 65. Relaxing public debt target and public investment – impact on growth
Note: We assume an elasticity of .1 between public capital stock and potential growth.
Source: iAGS model.
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To facilitate the correction of EA imbalances, EA member states should
encourage even higher inflation in high current account surplus countries
(Germany, Austria and Netherlands). Indeed there is a room for more than 2%
inflation on average in EA for the 20 next years, as average inflation has been
lower than 2% on average since 2000. Higher inflation in these countries would
induce competitiveness gains for the other EA members, which could improve
their trade balance and current account.
As an illustration, we simulate13 a positive shock of 0.2% each year on inflation
in Germany, Netherlands and Austria from 2020 onward. Results show that all
countries but Germany (CA would diminish by -0.7 point of GDP, see Figure 66)
and Netherlands (-0.1 point) would improve their current account by 2035
(from +0.1 for France to +1.0 for Austria14). Results also make evident that all
countries but Germany would gain economic activity (+0.2% to +0.5% of
cumulative output gap for France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Finland and
12. This effect depends a lot on the link between public investment and output. For an elasticity of
0.05, the increase in net assets in 2035 is nearly 0. This shows the importance of management
and allocation of public investment. Bom and Lightart (2014) retain a range from .08 to .17,
leaving room for more optimistic perspectives.
Table 18. Fiscal space and Public investment (2017-2035) – impact on public debt 
and assets
% of GDP
DEU FRA ITA ESP NLD BEL GRC PRT IRL AUT FIN EA
Add. public invest-
ment per year
0.11 0.15 0.11 0.21 0.13 0.16 0.0 0.11 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.12
Gross Public debt 
variation, 2035
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 nc 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Gross Public assets 
variation, 2035
1.2 1.9 1.4 2.6 1.6 2.0 nc 1.4 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.6
Net public assets 
variation, 2035
0.2 0.9 0.4 1.6 0.6 1.0 nc 0.4 -0.1 0.1 0.3 0.6
Note: Gross Public assets variation is computed with a 5% depreciation scheme hypothesys for public capital.
Source: iAGS model.
13. For simulations, we use the iAGS model (technical appendix is available on request). For the
baseline scenario from which we compute differences we assume that:
  — fiscal policy entails achieving 60% public debt-to-GDP ratio in 2035;
  — symmetric nominal adjustments to correct EA internal current accounts discrepancies;
  — euro exchange rate appreciation to 1.2 dollar in 2020 and beyond.
14. This result comes from a strong improvement of the terms of trade for that country due to a
lower elasticity of export prices to export prices of competitors compared to the other countries
(elasticity of 0.18).
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Ireland). The average inflation rate would only increase by 0.06 point each year
on 2016-2035 (see Table 19), which would be compatible with ECB target in
the long run. Slightly higher inflation would also ease the burden of debt by
1.8 point of GDP in 2035, giving fiscal space to sustain growth and fight unem-
ployment in the EA.  
Figure 66. Relaxing inflation in high CA surplus countries – impact on trade balance
Source: iAGS model.
Table 19. Relaxing inflation in high CA surplus countries – impact on current 
account in 2035
% of GDP
DEU FRA ITA ESP NLD BEL GRC PRT IRL AUT FIN EA
Public debt 
variation
-1.2 -0.9 -1.4 -1.2 -3.1 -4.1 -2.3 -2.1 -4.3 -7.1 -3.5 -1.8
Cumulative 
inflation 
2016-2035
2.9 0.1 0.1 0.1 2.9 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.3 3.1 0.2 1.2
Source: iAGS model.
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Cooperation would indeed make the adjustment softer, increase growth in the
euro area and reduce the risk of deflation. It requires that countries fully take
advantage of their fiscal rooms of manoeuvre when they have some fiscal space.
It also requires surplus countries to accept more inflation and to revise their
national inflation target upward. Yet, it remains to stress that a cooperative
solution would only be a second-best: as we showed, trade-offs between inter-
dependent objectives (debt, current account and growth) will still arise.
4.4. Policy recommendations
The recovery that started in 2014 in the euro area is faltering whereas output
gap has not yet closed and the unemployment rate remains above its pre-crisis
level. Divergence among European countries will widen if economic policy is
not changed. It is still time to change and implement policies aiming at
enhancing growth and convergence of living standards. The current institu-
tional design may provide rooms of manoeuvre that need to be explored. In the
longer term, changing the Treaties should also be considered as an option. 
Use fiscal space
Fiscal space in countries where fiscal rules are not binding should be used
to implement more expansionary fiscal policies. It would not only boost
growth in those countries but would have positive spill-over effects on other EA
countries. 
Relax fiscal constraints 
However, we should not expect too much from expansionary fiscal policies only
in some countries. European growth cannot rely only on German expenditures.
Expansionary fiscal policy in Germany would first benefit Germany, increasing
the growth and living standard divergence among European countries. More
fiscal leeway is necessary (for details, see Chapter 3.2). A positive fiscal
impulse is needed in countries where the output gap is negative. EA countries
need some leeway that avoids the caveats of a fiscal stimulus restricted to a
small group of countries. To that end, escape clauses might be extended.
The investment clause may already be used for countries with deficit below 3%
of GDP. A generalization of such an escape clause should be considered. In the
future, it may call for a change in the Treaties to promote fiscal rules from
which investment expenditures are excluded. Relaxing the public debt target
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and delaying the adjustment of structural public balances would also contribute
to provide additional room of manoeuvre for EA countries.
Promote investment to raise future growth, future standards of living and reduce 
structural divergence
Productivity-enhancing investments must be favoured, notably in external
deficit countries. The correction of current account imbalances cannot only be
addressed through cost-competitiveness. Favouring public and private invest-
ment is necessary to reduce structural divergence and promote the
convergence of the standards of living among EU countries.
Make the MIP more symmetric
External imbalances have persisted in the euro area despite the reduction of
current account deficits. The adjustment has remained asymmetric, weighing
mainly on deficit countries. The MIP should be made more symmetric and
encourage reflation policies in countries with high current account surplus.
It would for example imply higher increase in the minimum wage. The indica-
tors included in the scoreboard should be made more symmetric. Actually,
if a positive threshold has been identified for the current account to signal
macroeconomic imbalances, its absolute value is inferior to the threshold for
deficit countries: +6% against -4% of GDP. Moreover, indicators related to
nominal wage cost only and real effective exchange rate only point to an upper
value. A low wage growth may signal a weak demand. A bottom value should
be introduced for nominal unit labour cost.
Promote a golden wage rule and more wage coordination
Wage growth in EA countries should stay close to the sum of the rate of
productivity and the inflation target of the ECB (2%). Following this rule
would imply that the target of the ECB is more easily reached by creating a
nominal anchor through the wage dynamic. Moreover, wage coordination
policy should be reinforced by the generalization of wage floors through
minimum wages or collective agreements and cross-country coordination
of their increases. To that end recentralization of wage negotiations at the
national and sectoral levels would be desirable as well as the generalizations of
collective agreements. 
iAGS 2017 — independent Annual Growth Survey 5th Report164
Improve EU institutional design
Lasting convergence with balanced, non-inflationary growth would require
changes to both the policy content and institutional design of the euro area.
Cornerstones of a reform agenda, that as far as possible makes use of existing
procedures or elements that have already been envisaged (for instance in the
Five presidents’ Report) could involve the following elements (for details see
Koll/Watt, forthcoming). The starting point is a revitalisation of the procedure
of economic policy co-ordination as laid down in Article 121 TFEU, with the
Broad Economic Policy Guidelines as its central element. In terms of policy
content the BEPGs are appropriate to the needs of macroeconomic manage-
ment in Europe but they have essentially been forced to the sidelines by the
inappropriate fixation with fiscal rules focused narrowly on deficit reduction and
the asymmetrical MIP. This change would enable the policy mix between
aggregate-level monetary policy and predominantly national fiscal policies and
incomes policies to be evaluated within a common and consistent framework,
under the overarching treaty-based recognition of the necessity to regard
economic policies as a matter of “common interest”.
Member states commit to using a mix, appropriate to the country in question,
of fiscal and incomes policies, in order to ensure demand and nominal wage
and price developments consistent with overall policy goals such as laid down
in Art. 3 TFE and Art. 119 TFEU. Persistent non-compliance with agreed
trajectories would need to be sanctioned, as envisaged for instance in the
Five Presidents’ Report (e.g. with a denial of access to common “public goods”
–structural funds, common fiscal measures, etc.).
The recommendations under the BPEG should be quantified where possible,
in particular providing alternative macroeconomic development scenarios
under different policy assumptions. To this end, the recently established Euro-
pean Fiscal Council should be expanded in terms of personnel and
resources and broadened in scope to refer to the overall policy mix. As a
starting-point its work should serve a revised, symmetrical set of indicators
along the lines of the MIP. In parallel the expert-advisory productivity
boards at national level should be established also with a remit to analyse the
overall macroeconomic policy mix of the Member State concerned. These
bodies serve to develop non-binding technical analyses and consistent
scenarios. They might usefully be renamed “National Convergence Boards”. 
In order to ensure the linkage between expert analysis and effective policy-
making an option that builds on an existing institution would be to substantially
strengthen the existing Macroeconomic Dialogue–which brings together the
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social partners, the central banks and representatives of the Commission and
national fiscal policy at EU level (see e.g. Koll 2005). To this end an MED should
be established at the level of the Euro Area (EUROMED). It would be
strengthened vis-a-vis the existing MED at EU level by intensifying the links to
the Eurogroup. Specifically we propose incorporating representatives of the
social partners into some of the Eurogroup’s deliberations (Extended Euro-
group format). At the same time, MEDs should be established in all Member
States. The precise institutionalisation may vary depending on national struc-
tures, but the key issue is to bring together representatives of national fiscal
policy, the national central bank and the social partners to debate policy issues
in the light of the expert analyses provided by the European and national-
level boards.
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APPENDIX 3. MIP: the asymmetric nature of the macroeconomic 
surveillance
A new exercise in numerology?
A first stage of the MIP resorts to pinpointing the position of countries regarding
thresholds, an approach close to the one already used for identifying excessive defi-
cits in the Stability and growth pact (SGP). A first remark is that an over-
interpretation of a numerical target should be avoided. Otherwise we may fear the
risk of a new exercise in numerology that will create new rules of conduct without a
clear and stable meaning as regards the numbers to be targeted. Within the SGP,
the rule of conduct has long focussed on a public deficit at 3% of GDP, though this
threshold lacks a theoretical and empirical basis. The proposed thresholds of the
MIP are not based on sound theoretical or empirical conclusions which may show
that breaching the thresholds echoes an unsustainable macroeconomic situation. A
second remark relates to the identification of imbalances: it should not only rely on
figures but it has to be based on in-depth economic analysis. The financial crisis has
made clear that countries like Spain and Ireland which fulfilled the 3%-of-GDP limit
on public deficit have also undergone a deep crisis. 
Eventually, the general surveillance of a Member state’s macro imbalances must go
beyond a few targeted numbers which are without clear economic rationale and it
should rely on an in-depth economic analysis. Yet, we must recognise that the MIP
makes it clear that a thorough “economic” reading will complement the surveil-
lance. In that view, the list of indicators will only serve as an early-warning signal.
The scoreboard is an alert system but main decisions and major recommendations
will result from “economic reading” and “in-depth analysis”. Considering the
distinction between “rough indicators” of the scoreboard and “in-depth analysis”,
questions about the hierarchy can emerge. On the one hand, if surveillance of
macro imbalances relies mainly on the scoreboard, it will be difficult to avoid an
excessive number of false alarms: a so-called “excessive” current account deficit
may finally reflect a catching-up process. On the other hand, if surveillance relies
mainly on “in-depth analysis”, recommendations by the Commission will be discre-
tionary. In case of discrepancy between recommendations and the scoreboard, the
MIP will not deliver a clear and transparent message to the misleading country. 
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Not all imbalances should be treated equally
Second, not all imbalances are alike and the aim of the scoreboard (and of the
surveillance) should be to identify (or correct) only those which may threaten the
sustainability of growth and debts all over the euro area. Current account deficit as
such is only a symptom, not the cause of the disease. One has thus to answer two
questions: where do imbalances come from? How are they financed? Imbalances
may indeed proceed from unfavourable developments in competitiveness or from
internal demand, hence requiring different medicine. Both causes are also highly
dependent on favourable developments in competitiveness or on the lack of internal
demand in partner countries. Thus, in-depth analysis of macro imbalances requires
taking into consideration international linkages. 
Have current account deficits (surpluses) been caused by higher (lower) domestic
consumption or by higher (lower) domestic investment? Higher consumption may
fuel credit and a bubble. Investment, provided it remains productive, may enhance
productivity and generate future economic growth. While the former may end up
with ever-growing debts and a financial crisis, the latter may be self-financed over
the long-run. The growth of total factor productivity (TFP) would help to assess the
sustainability of current account deficits. By the same token, for catching up coun-
tries the dynamics of relative GDP per capita would also be a relevant indicator.
Have current account deficits (surpluses) been financed by net inflows (outflows) of
foreign direct investment, higher (lower) retained earnings or net inflows (outflows)
of portfolio investment? The latter can be volatile, hence introducing counter-
productive uncertainty in the economy. The former can create positive backward
spillover effects in the host countries (see Havranek and Irsova, 2011). It is thus
important to know about the structure of capital flows. Once again, this issue has
been left to the “economic reading” or in-depth analysis without any further indica-
tion on the way it would be implemented.
An asymmetric assessment of imbalances
Currently, most indicators are asymmetric. For instance, the current account
threshold is set between a surplus of 6% of GDP and a deficit of 4% of GDP. There is
no economic rationale for that numbers in particular; and there is no economic
rationale as well for introducing an asymmetry in the current account threshold.
What makes a deficit above 4% more dangerous to the stability of the euro area
than a surplus above 4% (but below 6%)? It seems difficult to argue that German
current account surpluses, above 4%, are more innocuous to the euro area than a
deficit above 4% in a small country like Greece. The reverse is certainly more correct. 
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To make things clear, let us switch from ratios to levels. The level of external debt
that a German surplus of 4% of its GDP entails is far higher than the level of
external debt that a small-country deficit of 4% of its GDP entails. Hence, the dise-
quilibrium forces, and thus the systemic risk, of a large country surplus are stronger
than a small country deficit’s. An indicator of trade imbalances which manages to
monitor their impact on growth, price and financial stability should rely on levels
rather than percentage points of GDP. The trade surplus of a large country will fuel
credit by domestic banks to smaller countries; if it is huge, the availability of credit
in the latter countries will produce easy money and a boom-bust situation.
Portugal, Greece, Cyprus and even Spain are certainly good examples in this
respect. Their external deficits were largely financed by capital flows from Northern
countries and notably Germany and France (Chen et al., 2013). To illustrate this
point further, one can compare the respective amounts of (current) euros that a
current account surplus of 6% of 2013 GDP in Germany and current account defi-
cits of 4% of 2013 GDP in Greece, Portugal and Spain mean. The German surplus
will amount to more than 160 € bn (109 € bn if the surplus achieves only 4% of the
German GDP), whereas the deficits will amount to 7, 6 and 40 € bn in Greece,
Portugal and Spain respectively. It is straightforward that the impacts on the euro
area are not comparable! Then, if the German surpluses mirrored weak investment
opportunities and weak internal demand, the deflationary forces would have been
very powerful in the Eurozone if they had not been partially absorbed by deficits in
other euro area countries.
In comparison with the indicator referring to the current account position, others
relating to competitiveness and market shares are even more asymmetric: the
burden of responsibility is exclusively borne by deficit/debtor countries. This is
notably the case for the net international investment position which is, by construc-
tion, the accumulation of past current account balances. Because of this bias in
signalling only a certain type of imbalances, it is possible to miss the fact that a
market share loss by a given euro area country may have as counterpart a market
share gain by another one. Therefore, there is a risk that recommendations will be
geared toward deficit countries urging them to adjust wage costs downward or to
implement restrictive policies. Conversely it will fail to signal that surplus countries
have run competitive disinflation policies, as confirmed recently. The European
Commission decided not to put Germany into surveillance for macroeconomic
imbalances despite its current account surplus exceeding 6% for two consecutive
years. As stressed by De Grauwe (2012), the current governance of macroeconomic
imbalances in the euro area endorses the tyranny of creditor countries. The result
will be that the euro area as a whole will continue to implement a global defla-
tionary policy. By only signalling competitiveness losses, the MIP will actually miss to
signal a coordination problem among euro area countries. 
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The same remarks hold for indicators of internal imbalances. By considering only the
increases in private sector credit flows, the scoreboard will only signal member
states facing overheating although weaknesses in internal demand may also be a
source of disequilibrium. For macro surveillance to be consistent with article 2 of the
Consolidated EU Treaty (stipulating that the general objectives of the EU are to
promote a high level of employment and social protection, the raising of standard
of living and quality of life, and economic and social cohesion and solidarity among
Member states), it should not only point out the risks of an excess development in
credit and asset prices. For instance, a growth slowdown in credit flows may signal a
situation of credit crunch or weakness in internal demand. It would then be useful
to consider a lower limit to the credit flows to the private sector.
APPENDIX 4. iAGS model hypotheses and simulations  
Table A1. Public finance and output performances under the baseline scenario
(no risk premium, no fiscal impulse beyond 2018, time-varying fiscal multiplier, hysteresis effects)
Public debt 
(% of GDP)
Structural 
balance 
(% of GDP)
Cumula-
tive fiscal 
impulse
GDP growth rate 
(%)
Average 
output 
gap
Inflation rate 
(%)
(1)
2020
(2)
2035
(3)
2020
(4)
2035
(5)
2015-
2035*
(6)
2016-
2020
(7)
2021-
2035
(8)
2016-
2035
(9)
2016-
2020
(10)
2021-
2035
DEU 60 33 0.0 0.6 1.0 1.3 1.0 0.5 1.6 2.0
FRA 95 91 -2.3 -3.1 -0.7 1.6 1.4 -0.3 1.5 2.0
ITA 129 101 -0.8 -0.5 0.2 0.7 0.3 -0.3 1.3 2.0
ESP 102 101 -3.1 -3.6 0.0 2.3 1.4 -0.1 0.7 2.0
NLD 61 41 -0.3 -0.3 -0.7 1.6 1.3 -0.1 1.0 2.0
BEL 99 65 -0.2 -0.3 -2.1 1.3 1.6 -0.6 1.8 2.1
PRT 121 87 -0.4 -0.5 -1.5 1.4 1.1 -1.4 1.4 2.1
IRL 82 51 -0.9 -0.1 -0.7 2.2 1.9 0.9 0.7 1.9
GRC 178 182 -4.8 -6.4 0.3 1.8 1.2 -2.5 0.9 2.2
FIN 66 79 -2.1 -3.8 -0.4 1.6 1.7 -1.0 1.3 2.1
AUT 77 61 -0.6 -1.2 0.4 1.4 1.5 -0.8 1.5 2.1
EA 89 71 -1.1 -1.3 0.0 1.4 1.1 -0.1 1.3 2.0
* In the baseline scenario, fiscal impulses are equal to 0 from 2019 to 2035.
Source: iAGS model.
iAGS 2017 — independent Annual Growth Survey 5th Report170
Table A2. Is it possible to reach a 60% debt-to-GDP ratio? 
(baseline scenario except +/- 0.5 fiscal impulses depending on public debt gap vis-à-vis 60% target)
Public debt 
(% of GDP)
Structural 
balance 
(% of GDP)
Cumula-
tive fiscal 
impulse
GDP growth rate 
(%)
Average 
output 
gap
Inflation rate 
(%)
(1)
2020
(2)
2035
(3)
2020
(4)
2035
(5)
2015-
2035
(6)
2016-
2020
(7)
2021-
2035
(8)
2016-
2035
(9)
2016-
2020
(10)
2021-
2035
DEU 62 60 -1.5 -1.8 2.8 1.4 1.0 0.7 1.6 1.9
FRA 93 60 -0.8 -0.1 -3.0 1.4 1.5 -0.5 1.4 2.0
ITA 128 60 1.0 3.2 -2.6 0.5 0.3 -0.6 1.2 2.0
ESP 101 60 -1.4 0.5 -3.1 2.0 1.5 -0.4 0.6 2.0
NLD 62 60 -1.6 -2.1 0.8 1.9 1.3 0.2 1.1 2.0
BEL 98 60 -0.3 0.4 -2.4 1.5 1.5 -0.5 1.9 2.0
PRT 123 60 0.8 2.2 -3.8 1.0 1.2 -1.8 1.3 2.1
IRL 84 60 -1.5 -1.0 0.0 2.2 1.9 0.9 0.7 1.9
GRC 185 114 -2.7 3.7 -9.4 0.9 1.1 -4.1 0.6 2.2
FIN 63 60 -0.9 -2.1 -1.7 1.5 1.7 -1.1 1.2 2.1
AUT 75 60 -0.6 -1.2 0.5 1.5 1.5 -0.7 1.6 2.1
EA 88 61 -0.8 -0.2 -0.8 1.4 1.1 -0.2 1.3 2.0
Source: iAGS model.
Table A3. Correction of fiscal and external imbalances in symmetric price 
adjustment case 
Public debt 
(% of GDP)
Structural balance 
(% of GDP)
Cumula-
tive 
fiscal 
impulse
Average 
output 
gap
Inflation rate 
(%)
Current 
account 
adjustment
(1)
2020
(2)
2035
(3)
2020
(4)
2035
(5)
2016-
2035
(6)
2016-
2035
(7)
2016-
2020
(8)
2021-
2035
(9)
2035-2016
DEU 62 60 -1.3 -2.0 2.5 0.1 1.7 2.5 1.2
FRA 93 60 -0.9 0.1 -3.0 -0.3 1.4 1.7 4.6
ITA 128 60 1.0 3.4 -2.6 -0.4 1.2 1.8 4.7
ESP 101 60 -1.4 0.6 -3.0 -0.1 0.6 1.7 11.2
NLD 62 60 -1.7 -2.2 0.9 0.1 1.2 2.3 0.0
BEL 99 60 -0.4 0.4 -1.6 0.4 1.7 1.4 3.3
PRT 124 60 0.7 2.9 -4.5 -1.8 1.2 1.6 8.4
IRL 84 60 -1.6 -1.2 0.1 0.8 0.8 2.4 4.0
GRC 186 121 -2.7 4.0 -9.4 -3.4 0.4 1.3 0.1
FIN 63 60 -1.6 -2.0 -0.9 -0.2 1.2 1.5 2.1
AUT 76 60 -1.7 -1.5 1.7 0.2 1.7 2.3 1.2
EA 89 61 -0.9 -0.3 -0.8 -0.2 1.3 2.0 3.7
The adjustment of current account is computed as the change in the current account between 2016 and 2035.
Source: iAGS model.
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Table A4. Correction of fiscal and external imbalances, with appreciation of 
the euro up to 1.2
Public debt 
(% of GDP)
Structural balance 
(% of GDP)
Cumula-
tive 
fiscal 
impulse
Average 
output 
gap
Inflation rate 
(%)
Current 
account 
adjustment
(1)
2020
(2)
2035
(3)
2020
(4)
2035
(5)
2015-
2035
(6)
2016-
2035
(7)
2016-
2020
(8)
2021-
2035
(9)
2035
DEU 62 60 -0.1 -1.7 1.0 -1.01 1.7 2.6 4.8
FRA 94 60 -0.9 0.1 -3.0 -0.4 1.4 1.8 -1.8
ITA 130 60 0.9 3.7 -3.3 -0.9 1.1 1.9 -1.6
ESP 102 60 -1.5 0.8 -3.2 -0.3 0.5 1.8 1.1
NLD 60 60 -1.1 -2.2 0.3 -0.5 1.2 2.4 6.4
BEL 94 60 -1.1 0.0 -0.5 0.9 2.0 1.5 -1.3
PRT 113 60 0.0 1.7 -1.6 -0.1 1.5 1.6 -4.3
IRL 79 60 -1.5 -1.4 0.1 0.4 1.0 2.5 6.5
GRC 181 101 -2.5 5.4 -9.4 -2.7 0.5 1.4 -10.1
FIN 61 60 -2.3 -2.3 0.2 0.5 1.4 1.5 -1.6
AUT 71 60 -1.8 -1.8 2.5 0.5 1.9 2.3 3.0
EA 88 61 -0.5 -0.1 -1.3 -0.6 1.3 2.1 0.4
Source: iAGS model.
Table A5. Main hypotheses for 2016
In %
Public debt
(2015)
Fiscal 
balance
Structural 
balance
Primary 
structural 
balance
output gap
(2015)
Long-term 
growth
DEU 71.2 0.5 0.2 1.7 0.2 1.0
FRA 95.8 -3.3 -2.4 -0.4 -1.8 1.4
ITA 132.7 -2.6 -0.8 3.0 -3.7 0.2
ESP 99.2 -4.3 --3.0 -0.4 -5.0 1.4
NLD 65.1 -1.3 -0.7 0.2 -2.5 1.3
BEL 106.0 -2.8 -2.2 0.2 -1.2 1.5
PRT 129.0 -3.0 -0.8 3.0 -5.5 1.0
IRL 93.8 -0.6 -1.9 0.7 0.6 1.8
GRC 176.9 -3.2 -2.5 1.7 -12.0 1.0
FIN 63.1 -2.3 -1.1 -0.7 -3.7 1.6
AUT 86.2 -1.2 0.0 1.8 -2.8 1.4
Source: iAGS model.

